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EVIDENCE
RICHARD

TouBy4

Introduction
Many interesting and novel (to Florida) evidence questions arose during
the period covered by this Survey. In the main, it was gratifying to note
the obviously careful attention given by the courts to an area of law too
often neglected. Evidence for its own sake is no more to be fostered than
procedure for procedure's sake, but careful attention to the field of evidence
is as important today as it was once thought to be in the process of the
determination of the truth of the facts in issue between parties as well
as the preservation of the rights of litigants and witnesses.
The Florida Legislature enacted legislation broadening our immunity
statute, in cases where a witness is required to testify in our new promoting
litigation Statute, chapter 59-381. The Legislature likewise extended the
scope of confidential communications to include Ministers, Priests, Rectors,
Rabbis and others like situated. [Florida Statutes chapter 59-144 (1959).]
Section 90.231 of the Florida Statutes has been amended to include expert
witnesses who are subpoenaed before a state attorney or a grand jury
and the provision exempting condemnation suits has been eliminated.
Section 317.231 has been added to provide that a witness otherwise
qualified to testify may testify when his testimony is derived from the use
of an electronic, electrical, or mechanical speed measuring- device upon
certain conditions therein stated.
Judicial Notice
In the case which established the presumption of negligence in rearend automobile collision cases, the court took judicial notice of the fact
that it is the duty of a motorist to stop at an intersecting street when
the light is red.' The supreme court took judicial notice that all of the
defendants in a criminal case charged with armed robbery were within
an age group that commits a very large percentage of crimes in this
country.2 Courts in this state do not take judicial notice of municipal
ordinances.Burden of Proof
In a suit by a client against a deceased attorney's estate to cancel
promissory notes executed by the client in favor of the attorney, the
*'Professor, University of Miami School of Law.

1. NicNulty v. Cusack, 104 So.2d 785 (Fla. App. 1958).
2. Stanford v. State, 110 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1959).

3. Conrad v. Jackson, 107 So.2d 369 (Fla. 1958); Younglhans v. State, 97 So.2d
31 (Fla, 1957).
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court held that the burden of establishing the lack of consideration was
4
cast upon the plaintiff client.
In reversing the trial judge who in a wrongful death action at the
close of the plaintiff's case withdrew the case from the jury and directed
a verdict for the defendant, the court decided that the trial judge
improperly weighed the evidence in much the same way as the jury
might be expected to do and discredited the testimony of one of the
chief witnesses for the plaintiff because of a prior inconsistent statement.5
Although in a criminal prosecution for homicide the jury is the sole
judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight of the evidence,
the court is the judge of its sufficiency. If a verdict is supported by
evidence it will not be disturbed on appeal, but the legal effect of
competent evidence which is not impeached, discredited or controverted
is a question of law.6
In Commercial Credit Corporation v. Varn,7 the plantiff slipped on

the defendant's floor and injured her foot. She introduced no testimonial
or direct evidence either as to the condition of the floor or the cause of the
skidding. In order to arrive at the conclusion that the defendant was
responsible in damages for the ultimate injury, the jury would have had
to infer in the first place that under all of the circumstances there was
negligence on the part of the defendant in the maintenance of the floor.
In addition, it would have had to infer that such negligence produced a
dangerous condition of the floor which in turn existed at the time the
plaintiff walked over it and then the ultimate final inference that such
inferred dangerous condition was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's
skidding. There being no direct evidence of the dangerous condition of
the floor, the court said that the inference of this dangerous condition was
not justified to the exclusion of all other reasonable inferences. This
being so, the ultimate conclusion of the jury would have to be founded
upon inferences based upon inferences. The above is a factual demonstration of the legal rule applied by the court that the inference of the
existence of an essential fact to be drawn from circumstantial evidence
cannot be made the basis of a further inference of an essential fact,
unless it can be said that the initial inference was established to the
exclusion of any other reasonable inference.
In reversing a chancellor and remanding the cause for the entry of
a decree opposite to that entered by the chancellor, the court said that
when uncontradicted testimony consists of facts, as distinguished from
opinions, and it is not illegal, improbable or unreasonable or contrary
within itself, it should not be wholly disregarded, but should be accepted
4. Gerlach v. Donnelly, 98 So.2d 493 (Fla. 1957).
5. Leslie v. Atlantic Coastline R.R.. 103 So.2d 645 (Fla. App. 1958).
6. Harris v. State, 104 So.2d 739 (Fla, App. 1958).
7. 108 So.2d 638 (Fla. App. 1959).
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as proof of the issue.8 It should be noted that this is not a case where
the appellate court is remanding for a new trial, but rather a case in which
it is determining as a matter of law that certain testimony must be
accepted as true and a decree based thereon, that is, that the party has
reached the stage of complete persuasion as a matter of law.
"Reasonably certain" is the test that is applied in the case of Stores v.
Hussey," for the determination of whether or not a mortality table is
admissible into evidence in support of an injury which is alleged to be
permanent in nature.
Proof of fraud must be by clear and convincing evidence. However, the
uncorroborated testimony of the mortgagors as to the fraud in the procurement of the mortgage is sufficient to vitiate it even though the mortgage
has been acknowledged.' 0 In order to establish adultery, the circumstances
proven must be such as to lead the guarded discretion of a reasonable and
just man to the guilt of the participants." Conviction of incest may be
12
upon the uncorroborated testimony of the prosecutrix.
Presumptions
By far, the most significant decision in this area was the case of
McNulty v. Cusack,"3 which established a presumption of negligence in
the case of a rear-end automobile collision and which has been followed
in two other cases.' 4 A true presumption is created rather than an inference
in that the court says that the establishment of the presumption compels
rather than permits a decision in the absence of rebutting evidence.
The District Court of Appeal, Second District, had occasion in the case
of Bryant v. City of Tampa, 15 to re-state the rule often stated by our
supreme court that the violation of a municipal ordinance creates a prima
facie showing of negligence, in an automobile collision case which involved
an exceeding of the speed limit. There is a presumption that where married
people live together in a common home, the husband is the head of the
family.' The rule that a presumption vanishes when it is rebutted is
demonstrated in the cases of Gerlach v. Donnelly," and Atlantic Coast
Line Railroad Company v. Connell."' In the latter, the statutory presumption of negligence by the railroad placed upon it the burden of
8. Kinney v. Mosher, 100 So.2d 644 (Fla. App. 1958).
9. 100 So.2d 649 (Fla. App. 1958).
10. Myerson v. Boyce, 97 So.2d 488 (Fla. App. 1957).
11. Parker v. Parker, 97 So.2d 136 (Fla. 1957).
12. Knight v. State, 97 So.2d 116 (Ma. 1957).
13. 104 So.2d 785 (Fla. App. 1958); Note, 13 U. lIANi L.REv. 236 (1958).
14. Cooper v. Yellow Cab Co., 106 So.2d 436 (Fla. App. 1958); Shedden v. Yellow
Cab Co., 105 So.2d 388 (Fla. App. 1958).
15. 100 So.2d 665 (Fla. App. 1958).
16. Solomon v. Davis, 100 So.2d 177 (Fla. 1958).
17. 98 So.2d 493 (Fla. 1957).
18. 110 So.2d 80 (Ma. App. 1959).
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affirmatively showing that it had exercised all ordinary and reasonable care
and diligence, and when this was done the presumption ceased to exist.
In the former case, a suit on a negotiable instrument, the presumption
that it had been issued for a valuable consideration and that there was
delivery likewise ceased to exist when evidence was offered to the contrary.
In the case of Thompson v. Miami Transit Company,'9 the supreme
court distinguished between a presumption, which has the effect of making
a prima facie case without anything more, and an inference, which arises
from circumstantial evidence and enables a trier of fact to weigh the
evidence in the balance with all other evidence.
Relevancy
In Kellum v. State,20 the trial judge made a remark which might have
caused the jurors to consider that the crime with which the defendant
was charged was one of a series or wave of offenses by policemen. The
court reversed, holding that evidence of similar and disconnected crimes
which were committed by other members of the police force was inadmissible and that even evidence of collateral crimes of the defendant
himself, independent of and unconnected with the crime for which he
was on trial was also inadmissible.
At a trial for possesion of moonshine whisky and other related crimes,
the prosecuting witness was permitted to testify that she bought moonshine whisky from the defendant and that she had made several purchases
in the past and would go to the defendant whenever her stock was
depleted. The court said that the evidence was admissible, relying upon
the case of Davis v. State,2 1 in which the court had said that such evidence,
while not admissible to prove that the defendant committed the crime
charged, could be used to show his purpose, plan, intent or knowledge.
It would have been helpful had the court explained how the questioned
22
evidence would tend to show any of these items.
In introducing the relevancy section in the Third Survey of Florida
Law, 2 3 this writer said that one of the most difficult problems which faces
the judge in a trial of a law suit is ruling on the admissibility of evidence
which has slight probative value when compared with its possible undue
prejudice, confusion of issues, unfair surprise, and undue prolongation of
the trial. The court, in ruling on an objection, should take into consideration the purpose for which the evidence is being introduced; that is,
whether the same fact may easily be established by other non-prejudicial
evidence and whether the evidence is of a cumulative nature. The recent
19. 100 So.2d 620 (Fla. 1958).
20. 104 So.2d 99 (Fla. App. 1958).
21. Davis v. State, 87 So.2d 416, 418 (Fla. 1956).
22. Dixon v. State, 104 So.2d 122 (Fla, App. 1958).
23. 12 U. MIAMI L. Rrv. 580 (1958).
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case of Williams v. State,2 4 seems to justify the statement. In this prosecution
for the alleged rape of the seventeen year old prosecutrix, her testimony
was that she parked the family automobile on a parking lot in the vicinity
of Webb's City in St. Petersburg; she did some shopping and returned
to her car between 9:00 and 9:30 P.M., and that after she had driven
the car a short distance, the defendant suddenly reached over from the
back seat of the car, stabbed her in the chest with an ice pick and then
leaped over into the driver's seat and threatened to kill her if she did not
submit to his wishes and thereafter criminally assaulted her sexually on two
separate occasions. The defendant, who testified in his own behalf, did not
deny having had sexual relations with the prosceutrix, but his sole defense
was that this relationship with her was attained with her consent. His
testimony was that he had known the prosecutrix, had had prior dates
with her and had prev;iously had sexual relations with her with her consent;
that, on the date in question, he met her persuant to a prior arrangement
and that his sexual relations with her on that night were accomplished
with her consent and without threat. The prosecution was permitted to
introduce the testimony of a deputy sheriff (who arrested the defendant
the day following the alleged incident) that the defendant advised him on
this occasion that when lie saw the automobile lie thought it was his
brother's and crawled in the back to take a nap. As a part of its case
in chief, the state was permitted to introduce the testimony of a girl
aged sixteen regarding an incident which occurred some six weeks prior
to the attack on the prosecutrix. This testimony was that on the earlier
date the young lady had parked her car at approximately the same hour
and same parking lot as did the prosecutrix on the night in question and
upon returning to her car had opened the door and seen the head of a
man on the floor of the back seat of the car. She screamed and two
policemen came to her rescue. The occupant of the car ran. He was
identified as the defendant in this prosecution, and later, when taken to
police headuarters, testified that he had mistaken the car for his brother's
automobile and had crawled into the back of it to take a nap. The prior
incident involved a black Plymouth of a model several years earlier than
the green Buick driven by the prosecutrix.
The court, speaking through Mr. Justice Tlornal, approached the
problem of the admissibility of this other crime evidence in terms of a rule
of admissibility rather than a rule of exclusion. The court took the position
that the proper approach was not to consider the admissibility of the evidence
on the basis of an exception to the rule excluding such evidence, but
rather that the problem was a basic one of relevancy and concluded that
"the proper rule simply is that relevant evidence will not be excluded merely
because it relates to similar facts which point to the commission of a
separate crime." The court seems to have been influenced by two Harvard
24. 110 So.2d 654 (Fla. 1959).
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Law Review articles (appearing in volumes 46 and 51 Harvard Law Review
at pages 954 and 988 respectively).
State v. Goebel,25- was also a prosecution for rape and sodomy on
two young men about six weeks apart. At the trial, the defendant
testified concerning his route of going to the restaurant where he met the
second of the two young women and the state was permitted to introduce a
statement wherein the defendant stated that he went a different route and
there accosted a third young woman; attempted to have intercourse with her
against her will, but that she managed to open the truck door and escape.
This court was likewise was impressed with the two law review articles
heretofore mentioned; however, the policy of the court with regard to the
admissibility of this kind of evidence was stated in the following manner.
This is a situation where the policy of protecting a defendant from
undue prejudice conflicts with the rule of logical relevance, and
a proper deten-nination as to which should prevail rests in the sound
discretion of the trial court, and not merely on whether the
evidence conies within certain categories which constitute exceptions to the rule of exclusion .... (Emphasis added)
We dislike to send this case back for a new trial, for if the
evidence of the prosecuting witnesses, together with the defendant's
own signed statement, is to be believed, to describe him as a beast
is to libel the entire animal kingdom. Nevertheless, he was entitled
to a fair trial....
It is felt that the basic problem is not one of whether the evidence
is to be treated as an exception to a rule against admissibility or as a
basic problem of relevancy, but rather that a determination should be
made balancing the undue prejudice against the logical relevancy and
that there should not be automatic admissibility when the evidence comes
within the certain recognized categories.
Evidence that the operator of a motor scooter had a restricted license
is not admissible when no cause or connection appears between the
collision and the fact of the restricted license. 6 The act of being alone
in a house covered up in bed with a man is relevant as part of a defendant's
defense in establishing lack of prior chastity.27 In a prosecution for rape
where the defense is consent, the general reputation for chastity of the
prosecutrix is relevant.2s In an indictment for first degree murder where
the defense is self defense, proof of character of the deceased is by his
general reputation in the community for such character. The defendant
sought to introduce specific acts of violence by the deceased for the
purpose of showing her apprehension of eminent danger. The court indicated

25.
26.
27.
28.

36 Wash.Zd 367, 218 P.2d 300 (1950).
Coldner v. Levtin, 96 So.2d 553 (Fla. 1957).
Hickman v. State, 97 So.2d 37 (Fla. 1957).
Raulerson v. State, 102 So.2d 281 (Fla. 1958).
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that this evidence would be admissible provided the acts were within a
close proximity timewise to the occurrence of the homicide.2 9
In a prosecution for murder, the deceased's wife was called as the
state's first witness for the stated purpose of identifying the body of
her deceased husband from a photograph taken at the morgue. The state
had in the courtroom another witness (who was called later) who could
have identified the deceased. During defendant's opening statement, the
identity of the deceased was admitted. The state urged that since the
wife's testimony was for a proper purpose, viz. to establish the identity
of the deceased, it was immaterial that her testimony may have induced
sympathy for her loss to the prejudice of the defendant. The court held
that since this identity was admitted and could have been shown through
other witnesses, it was improper and prejudicial for the defendant to
permit the state to indirectly prove the decedent's family status in a
homicide prosecution. The court said that both the state and the accused
are under a heavy responsibility to present their evidence in a manner
most likely to secure for the accused a fair trial, free, insofar as possible,
from any suggestion which might bring before the jury any matter not
germane to the issue of guilt. 30
A type of custom and practice evidence presented a problem to the
court in the case of Tampa Drug Company v. Wait,31 which was an action
for wrongful death of a plaintiff who died as a result of the use of carbon
tetrachloride purchased from the defendant to clean floors. The alleged
negligence consisted of the failure to print on the label of the container an
adequate warning of the dangers characteristic of such product and the
fatal effects which might follow its use. The plaintiff was permitted to
introduce into evidence labels promulgated for the use of the chemical
industry by the labeling committee of the Manufacturing Chemists Association. The court said that the labels were admissible into evidence, "not...
to establish a conclusive standard of care," but are submitted to the
jury along with all the other evidence as a basis for comparing defendant's
label with others, merely as a guide to a determination of the adequacy
of the warning furnished by the defendant. It is suggested that this
evidence, although probably admissible, was not admitted to establish a
standard of care. The standard of care owing by the defendant to the
plaintiff is a matter of substantive law and not the subject matter of
evidence; but what the triers of fact are to determine is whether or not the
defendant fell below that standard of care imposed upon him by the
substantive law.
In a prosecution for larceny of money, evidence tending to show the
accused had no money before the larceny and considerable money thereafter,
29. Freeman v. State, 97 So.2d 633 (F1i. App. 1957).
30. Hathaway v. State, 100 So.2d 662 (Fla. App. 1958).
31. 103 So.2d 603 (Fla. 1958).
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is relevant and admissible. The flight of a person accused of a crime
is admissible although it raises no presumption of guilt.32 The reasoning
which forbids the consideration of forced sales also renders it incompetent
for either party to put in evidence the amount paid by the condcemnor to
the owners of neighborhood lands taken at the same time. 3
Demonstrative Evidence
Plaintiff instituted a suit for personal injuries as a result of the
defendant's negligence in failing to properly maintain the steps of its city
hall. Photographs of the steps taken subsequent to the accident were
admitted into evidence (apparently without objection). On appeal, 34 the
court took the position that it was improper to draw an inference from
the photographs that the steps were in a defective condition for a long
period of time and, by dicttuii, indicated that photographs in themselves
are not evidence of what they portray unless there is testimony of a witness
describing the condition from personal observation. In a criminal prosecution,3 5 a photograph of the decedent which showed him lying on a hospital
operating table with the point of entry of the bullet into his body being
visible was properly admitted into evidence. The photograph was introduced
to show the jury the point where the bullet penetrated deceased's body and
also to demonstrate that the shot was fired from such a distance as to
refute any claim of powder burus that might appear if the shooting had
occurred in the close confines of a struggle as claimed by the defendant.
Alston v. Shiver, 0 was a suit for assault and battery in which one of
plaintiff's witnesses identified an axe handle as a replica of the stick used
by the defendant in beating plaintiff. The court, in rejecting this evidence,
said that there was a difference in length between the actual instrument
and the replica and that the person offering such evidence was required
to give a good reason for its acceptance into evidence and this was particularly true if the object were not the original but only a replica or a facsimile.
Hearsay
Smith v. Molt, 37 was a suit for wrongful death of a decedent who
was struck by a truck while walking across a highway. The verdict and
judgment were for defendant. The sole ground of appeal (most unusual
in itself) was that on cross-examination of the plaintiff's witness who was
the County Medical Examiner, he testified that he examined the decedent's
body after death, and as part of his examination he took a blood sample,
designated it by name and number and sent it to the laboratories of the
32. Harrison v. State, 104 So.2d 391 (Fla. App. 19581.
33. Hollywood, Inc. v. Broward County, 107 So.2d 227 (Fla. App. 1958).

34.
35.
36.
37.

City of Jacksonville v. Hampton, 108 So.2d 768 (Ma. App. 1959).
Cullaro v. State, 97 So.2d 40 (Fla, 1957).
Alston v. Shiver, 105 So.2d 785 (Ha. 1958).
100 So,2d 173 (Fla. 1957).
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Florida State Board of Health in Miami. The result of the analysis was
sent by the Board of Health to the Medical Examiner, where it became
a part of his official records and reports. After referring to his records
and notes, the Medical Examiner testified, "the report was that in the
case of Ralph Smith, Medical Examiner case, Broward County, No. 382-55,
Blood Ethyl Alcohol was 0.210 percent by weight." Plaintiff objected to
the testimony because it was secondary evidence and hearsay evidence. The
trial court over-ruled the objection and the supreme court affirmed. Rehearing was granted but the court adhered to its initial opinion. The
court failed to distinguish between a record admissible under the "public
record" exception to the hearsay rule and secondary evidence of that public
record through the testimony of a witness concerning the contents of the
report, although from an examination of the file it appears that such was
the basis for granting the petition for re-hearing.
The admissions of an assignor are admissible against an assignee party
as admissions of a party opponent."" In a prosecution for violation of lottery
statutes,3 9 during a raid a deputy sheriff answered the telephone where
various individuals were placing bets during the progress of the raid.
Evidence of this fact was said to be admissible as a "verbal fact" and as
such the questioned evidence was not hearsay. Testimony by the prosecutrix
that friends told her that the defendant was an abortionist and that
thereafter she went to see the party so named is hearsay in a criminal
prosecution for criminal abortion. 40 The dissenting opinion in the case of
Martin v. Tindel,4 1 considers the admissibility of declarations of bodily
condition made to a physician consulted for the purpose of receiving

treatment and those made to a physician employed as a prospective
expert witness.
Admissions and confessions are of course exceptions to the hearsay
rule. A confession should not be rejected because it was made under
excitement or mental distress or disturbance not induced by extraneous
pressure exerted to compel a confession, but which arose from the confessor's
own apprehension due to the situation in which he found himself. Therefore,
the confession was properly admitted where the tiral court exercised
prudence and caution in determining the admissibility of a confession by
conducting a preliminary investigation in the absence of the jury and
requiring a proper predicate to be laid.42 In order for a confession to be
received in evidence there must be first introduced some independent proof
of the corpus delicti either directly or circumstantially sufficient to make
a prima facie showing. 43 Guilt cannot be found upon a naked extra-judicial
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Vineberg v. Hardison, 108 So.2d 922 (Fla. App. 1959).
Chacon v. State, 102 So.2d 578 (Fla. 1957).
Urga v. State, 104 So.2d 43 (Fla. App. 1958).
98 So.2d 473 (Fla. 1957).
Cullaro v. State, 97 So.2d 40 (Fla. 1957).
Frazier v. State, 107 So.2d 16 (Fla. 1958).
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confession or admission unsupported by proof of the corpus delicti of the
4
crime. 4
Best Evidence Rule
In a prosecution for abortion the defendant sought to impeach the
credibility of the prosecutrix by referring to her testimony at a prior
hearing which was inconsistent with her present testimony. The trial
judge sustained an objection to such testimony stating that the record
was the best evidence. Onl appeal, the court held that the best evidence
rule was not applicable. 5 An excellent discussion of the best evidence
rule can be found in the opinion of Judge Frank in Herzig v. Swift and
Company,"1 in which the trial judge rejected oral testimony concerning
partnership earnings on the ground that the books of the partnership
were the best evidence of the partnership earnings. He said:
In its modern application, the best evidence rule amounts to
little more than the requirement that the contents of a writing
must be proved by the introduction of the writing itself, unless
its absence can be satisfactorily accounted for. Here there was
no attempt to prove the contents of a writing; the issue was
the earnings of the partnership, which for convenience were
recorded in books of account after the relevant facts occurred.
Parol Evidence Rule
The Parol Evidence Rule applies only to the parties to a contract
or their privies. 4" Parol evidence may be admitted to clarify a matter
and show the true intention of the parties when a contract is entered
into and a second one (executed almost simultaneously with that of the
first) casts some doubt upon the meaning of a provision of the first

contract."
Privilege
Testimony not to show the details of an attempted compromise, but
rather to explain a provision of a consumated agreement is not within
the compromise and settlement privilege and conversations between the
attorneys for the parties are not privileged. 4 9
The fact that a defendant in a criminal trial did not testify at a
preliminary hearing was held to be within the privilege against selfincrimination and consequently the prosecuting attorney was not permitted
44. Alexander v. State, 107 So.2d 261 (Fla. App. 1958).

45.
v. State, 104 So.2d 43 (FIa. App. 1958).
46. Urga
146 F.2d
444 (1945).

47, Bessemer Properties v, Barber, 105 So.2d 895 (Fla. App. 1958).

48. J. M. Montgomery Roofing Co. v. Fred Ilowland, Inc., 98 So.2d 484 (Fla.
1957); see also Hood v. Hood, 100 So2d 422 (Fla. App. 1958).
49. Hood v. Hood, 100 So.2d 422 (Fla. App. 1958).

EVIDENCE

1959]

to comment before the court or jury on the failure of the accused so to
testify in his own behalf.50
Cross-Examination
The proper limits of cross-examination and the range to be permitted
during such examination is a matter, in criminal as well as in civil cases,
that lies within the sound discretion of the trial court. 5 1 In Frost v.
State,5 2 the defendant was convicted of aggravated assault on a police
officer. On direct examination of the officer it was shown that the defendant's
wife was at the scene of the happening and also that the police officer
had drawn his black jack. Cross-examination as to whether the officer
hit the defendant's wife with the black jack was not permitted. The court
reversed the conviction saying that since the subject had been introduced
on direct examination, cross-examination was a right which the defendant
had to examine into all matters considered on direct examination even
though the defendant testified extensively about the very things that
he sought to elicit on cross-examination.
A party may not impeach an immaterial statement made by a witness
unless such immaterial statement is shown to be prejudicial or otherwise
harmful to the party's right to a fair trial.53
5 4 and McArthur v. Cook 55 involved impeachment
Lockwood v. Stateby conviction of a crime and in both of these cases the court gave a very
clear and helpful statement of the process which must be followed. In
the latter case, the court first said that this method of impeachment is
applicable to both civil and criminal trials, and that the procedure to be
followed is that the witness must first be asked the straightforward
question as to whether he has ever been convicted of a crime. The inquiry
must end at this point unless the witness denied that he had been
convicted. In the event of such denial, the adverse party may then in
the presentation of his side of the case produce and file in evidence the
record of any such conviction. If the witness admits prior conviction of
a crime, the inquiry by his adversary may not be pursued to the point
of naming the crime for which he has been convicted. If the witness
so desires, lie may of his own volition state the nature of the crime and
offer any relevant testimony that would eliminate any adverse implication.
Conviction of a crime is a ground for impeachment even though such
conviction is in the pendency of an appeal.5"
50.
51.
52.
53.

Hathaway v. State,
Hathaway v. State,
Frost v. State, 104
Carter v. State, 101

777 (Fla. App. 1958).

100 So.2d 662 (Fla. App. 1958).
100 Sold 662 (a. App. 1958).
So.2d 77 (Fla. App. 1958).
So.2d 911 (Fla. App. 1958); Lockwood v. State, 107 So.2d

54. 107 So.2d 777 (Fla. App. 1958).
55. McArthur v. Cook, 99 So.2d 565 (Fla. 1957).
56. Gonzalez v. State, 97 So.Zd 127 (Fla. 1957).

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEWV

[
[VOL.
XIV

In a suit where counsel represents both the defendant insured and
defendant's insurance company, it is improper for counsel to impeach
57
the defendant.
Sodium Aniythal, the so called truth serum, may not be used either
for impeachment or rehabilitation purposes. 8
Co petency of Witnesses
In a criminal trial the defendant's counsel asked for the imposition
of the rule for the separation of witnesses, whereupon witnesses were
excluded from the courtroom. A witness read a copy of prior testimony
and objection to his competency to testify was overruled by the trial
judge. The court decided that while the entire matter of placing witnesses
under or excepting them froii the rule was within the discretion of the
trial judge as well as whether one who has been placed under the rule
and has violated the rule shall be allowed to testify, in this case, the
trial court had abused its discretion in permitting the witness to testify.,9
Opinion
The conclusion or opinion of an expert witness based upon facts or
inferences not supported by the evidence has no evidential value, nor
can a conclusion be deducted or inferred from the conclusion itself,
nor can the opinion constitute proof of the existence of facts necessary
to support the opinion." An expert may not give an opinion when it is
not based upon his personal knowledge of the type of rig used for a vehicle
under discussion and when his knowledge is based solely on a study of his
records. 6 ' The court in Miller v. TropIical Gables Court"-' aligned itself
with what it called the present trend of authority which makes no distinction
between evidential and ultimate facts as subjects of expert opinion. The
court said that when facts are within the ordinary experience of a jury
experts will not be permitted to testify to their conclusions, but when
the facts to be determined are obscure and can be only made clear
through the opinions of persons skilled in relation to the subject matter,
then it makes no difference whether the opinion be on an ultimate fact in
issue or not.

Admission and Exclusion
In a capital case, while ruling on defendant's objection to the
admissibility of evidence, the trial judge commented on testimony; he
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later stated to the jury that he did not wish to comment to the jury, and
lie had no right to do so and directed the jury not to consider his reference
to the evidence. The supreme court, none the less, held this to be
reversible errorY63 After both parties had rested their case the previous day
of trial, the plaintiff sought to re-open to introduce a witness in rebuttal;
this was not pennitted by the trial judge. The appellate court held that in
order for it to rule on this alleged error it would have been necessary for the
party seeking to re-open to make a proffer of the evidence which he desired
to introduce. Since this was not done, the court found it impossible to
4
determine whether the refusal of the lower court was prejudicial.
In an indictment for first degree murder, the failure of the defendant
to make timely objection to the court's prejudicial remarks was not fatal
so as to preclude a review thereof on appeal. 5 An error based upon an
improper question of a prosecuting attorney will not be considered on
appeal unless an objectior is timely made. However, this rule is subject
to the exception that if the improper question with its resultant answer
is of such character that neither the rebuke nor detraction may entirely
destroy its sinister influence, a new trial should be awarded regardless of
the want of an objection thereto. 66
Upon appropriate occasions, a juror as a trier of fact may be justified
in propounding a question to a witness.Y1 While it is undeniable that the
court may not participate actively in the questioning of a witness, he may
do so to clarify the witness's testimony, and where a witness's answers
are of such a nature as to acquire lengthy interrogation, such interrogation
is not improper.68
It was held error but not reversible error to permit the jury to take
into the jury room an exhibit which was marked for identification but
never admitted into evidence. 9
Where timely and proper objection is made to evidence on the
ground that it is inadmissible under the Dead Man's Statute and the
objection is over-ruled, the objecting party is entitled to fully cross-examine
70
on the subject without losing the protection afforded by the statute.
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64. Andrews v. Cardosa, 97 So.2d 43 (Fla. 1957).
65. Hamilton v. State, 109 So.2d 422 (Fla, App. 1959).
66. Hathaway v. State, 100 So.2d 662 (Fla. App. 1958).
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797 (Fla. 1958);
68. Younglans v. State, 97 So.2d 31 (Fla. 1957).
69. Beard v. State, 104 So.2d 680 (Fla. App, 1958).
70. Land v. Hart, 109 So.2d 589 (Fla. App. 1959).

